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In Defining Engagement, Hellyer examines three key actors of Tokugawa Japan’s foreign rela-
tions: the bakufu, Satsuma, and Tsushima. This approach stems from his observation that 
the central government, the bakufu, did not hold complete authority over foreign relations 
and that the maritime borders in which Satsuma and Tsushima were situated were not rig-
idly fixed. Indeed, Tokugawa Japan’s foreign trade thrived through the flow of silver, copper, 
raw silk, ginseng, marine products, medicinal roots, sugar, and other valuable commodities; 
this was a space in which multiple actors, agendas, and diverging interests and rivalries were 
in constant competition.
In understanding this intriguing web of interactions between the central and local 
agencies that shaped the changing contours of Tokugawa Japan’s foreign relations, Hellyer 
shows that “Japan’s foreign relations were not defined by an overriding ideology of 
seclusion.… Tokugawa leaders consistently made pragmatic decisions, especially concerning 
foreign trade, in accordance with global commercial contexts” (p. 4). Hellyer does an 
excellent job in ascertaining how pragmatic interests permeated into Tokugawa Japan’s 
foreign relations.
The strengths of Defining Engagement are threefold. First, Hellyer defies the tendency 
of current scholarship, which is compartmentalized into three groups of researchers working 
on Nagasaki, Satsuma, and Tsushima, respectively. For example, scholars who focus on 
Tsushima-Korea relations rarely attempt to explore the issues of Satsuma-Ryukyu trade. 
This kind of hairsplitting yet segregated specialization in the field often prevents readers 
from surveying the whole forest, revealing only some tall trees. Hellyer skilfully integrates 
the local perspectives of Satsuma and Tsushima into the overarching structure of foreign 
trade loosely guided by the bakufu. This approach allows readers to see clearly that “Satsuma 
and Tsushima leaders staked out places and roles for their domains in the overall system of 
foreign relations” (p. 50).
Second, Hellyer overcomes another tendency in current scholarship that rarely 
synthesizes Japan’s relations with Asia and the Dutch to the eighteenth century and those 
with Russia and the West from the late eighteenth century. The chronological divide 
between them still behaves like oil and water. Unlike many scholars in the field, Hellyer 
explores how Satsuma and Tsushima conducted trade, negotiated with the bakufu, and 
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promoted their local agendas in their own way through the 1860s. Situating Satsuma and 
Tsushima in the context of the overall bakufu policy, Hellyer clarifies “a ground-level view 
on how and why the system of Japanese foreign relations was on the verge of change in the 
1860s” (p. 233).
Third, Hellyer brings the local as well as central agendas of foreign relations into an 
integral framework of understanding by focusing on Japan’s connections with the China 
market. Examining from this angle, Hellyer finds that “while Western power was gradually 
emerging, Japan’s foreign trade and its overall system of foreign relations continued to be 
dominated by its connections with China” (p. 148). The China market, in Hellyer’s view, 
remained the most important factor of early modern Japan’s foreign relations, and occupied 
the minds of the policy makers of Satsuma, Tsushima, and the bakufu. Hellyer concludes: 
“The trade battle between the bakufu and Satsuma also occurred within the larger context 
of intercourse with the China market” (p. 148) to the end of Tokugawa Japan.
Despite these strengths, Defining Engagement is essentially based on secondary 
literature, not on original analysis of primary materials. It is noteworthy that Hellyer 
thoroughly scans through a wide range of works by Japanese scholars, gleans relevant data 
from them, and skilfully constructs a synthetic framework of understanding. But it should 
also be noted that his work, which is grounded in patchy and selective arguments, could be 
debunked when original research based on a range of rich extant primary materials brings 
up new findings and theories.
Another issue that makes Defining Engagement vulnerable is the author’s Japan-centered 
outlook. Needless to say, foreign relations involve more than one country. This book lacks 
the voices or agencies of Japan’s counterparts whose actions and reactions affected Japan’s 
foreign relations. In the early eighteenth century, notes Hellyer, Amenomori defined “a 
language of domain agency that Tsushima officials would utilize over the next 150 years” (p. 
65). In this language, Tsushima posited itself as the collector of intelligence on Korea and 
the continent, as well as a defensive bulwark of Japan. Does this mean that Korea posed a 
threat to Japan? Why did Korea then annually offer hundreds of bags of rice and beans to 
Tsushima? Hellyer continues: “In 1748, the Nagasaki magistrate characterized Satsuma’s 
defensive role as ‘containing’ Ryukyu” (p. 68). Again, this defensive role, which Tsushima 
and Satsuma played, remains enigmatic as long as the counterparts of their national defense 
are kept in darkness.
Similarly, Hellyer rarely traces how the China market, the focal point of Japan’s 
foreign trade, behaved over time. Throughout the book, the China market is presented as 
something rather passive, invisible, and static. Hellyer says: “Overall this study demonstrates 
that because the system of foreign relations was divided among several actors—the bakufu, 
Tsushima, and Satsuma—it included multiple voices and agendas which went beyond a 
single and commonly held ideology of seclusion” (p. 12). But these multiple voices and 
agendas are all squeezed into a Japan-centered perspective. Bilateral perspectives, which are 
supposed to constitute foreign relations, are in short supply.
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